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➲ Jameson, Buena Vista Social Club
and Other Exercises in the Restoration of the Real
The ethical primacy of the Other over the Same requires that the experi-
ence of alterity be ontologically ‘guaranteed’ as the experience of a distance,
or of an essential non-identity, the traversal of which is the ethical experi-
ence itself. But nothing in the simple phenomenon of the other contains such
a guarantee. And this simply because the finitude of the other’s appearing
certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as imitation, and thus lead
back to the logic of the Same. The other always resembles me too much for
the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true
(Badiou 2001: 22).
Thought of the Other is sterile without the Other of Thought. Thought
of the Other is the moral generosity disposing me to accept the principle of
alterity, to conceive of the world as not simple and straightforward, with
only one truth-mine. But thought of the Other can dwell within me without
changing me within myself. An Ethical principle, it is enough that I not vio-
late it. The Other of Thought is precisely this altering (Glissant 1997: 154).
The present global paradigm is built on a new complicity between power and knowl-
edge. In Santiago Castro-Gómez’s words, “the present global reorganization of the capi-
talist economy depends on the production of differences. As a result, the celebratory
affirmation of these differences, far from subverting the system, could be contributing to
its consolidation” (2002: 269). In other words, Empire thrives on the proliferation of oth-
erness, and assimilation or repression are no longer the favored strategies. The other is
now respected or produced for the sake of the market.
In this context, the critic faces an immediate danger. How do we prevent our “pro-
gressive” discourse, conceived as a defense of difference, from becoming a means of its
commodification? In other words, what if a certain “exhaustion of difference” is precise-
ly the market’s dearest script?1 What if our anxiety to preserve the other’s right to its
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1 Moreiras’ book of the same title is not at all blind to that danger: “A counterpolitics of the local, insofar
as it is itself a result of the movement of global capital is always essentially open to hijacking by the
movement of global capital itself: it can be tamed and reduced to a mere mechanism for identity con- Ib
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sumption, in much the same way as one is prompted to consume products of various kinds. Identity is
always open to commodification by the cultural-ideological apparatus of global capitalism” (2001:
279). Nevertheless, Moreiras does not question the potential complicity between his view of an essen-
tially negative “other”, the one who always says no to hegemonic interpellation (2001: 125-126), and
the mechanisms of that hegemonic interpellation, the functioning of which requires precisely that kind
of otherness to offer something that is always new but also to maintain its always expanding logic.
2 Laclau’s (Laclau/Mouffe 1985) conception of “radical democracy” makes reference to an alternative
political space in which different groups within civil society open up a new strategy for political action,
in which “local” interests function according to a certain analogical schema, in which any idea of total-
ity is only conceivable as multiple and heterogeneous. Laclau privileges the alterity of those groups
over their mutual articulation. A close critique of Laclau’s conception cannot be fully developed here,
but is suggested through analogies in the cultural field.
3 In Nelly Richard’s words: “Celebrating difference as exotic festival [...] is not the same as giving the
subject of this difference the right to negotiate its own conditions of discursive control, to practice its
difference in the interventionist sense of rebellion and disturbance as opposed to coinciding with the
predetermined meanings of the official repertory of difference” (1995: 221).
“otherness” is indeed feeding a constitutive need of Empire? How do we avoid the com-
plicity described by Hardt and Negri:
The structures and logics of power in the contemporary world are entirely immune to the
“liberatory” weapons of the postmodernist politics of difference. In fact, Empire too is best
on doing away with those modern forms of sovereignty and on setting differences to play
across boundaries (2000: 142).
In this sense, the new “universal” called globalization is built as a kind of “cultural
radical democracy” that feeds a certain kind of pre-scripted pluralism:2
This pluralism accepts all differences of who we are so long as we agree to act on the
basis of these differences of identity, so long as we act our race. Racial differences are thus
contingent in principle, but quite necessary in practice as markers of social separation. The
theoretical substitution of culture for race or biology is thus transformed paradoxically into a
theory of the preservation of race (Hardt/Negri 2000: 192).3.
Homi Bhabha has something similar in mind when he finds the most subversive ges-
ture of the subaltern not in the affirmation of difference but rather in the exercise of
mimicry, the confusion of identities and limits, the ventriloquism that hides or perhaps
dissolves the “real” voice behind.
How can the intellectual know, then, if, when he studies difference as a means to its
survival, or as an antidote to the new “universal”, he is not really writing the script for
“acting the race”? Sometimes the line between the mechanisms of academia and the
market is a very thin one. But, if that is so, why not study academic discourse along with
the market, and why not consider the continuities between the two?
One of the purposes of this paper is to develop an analogy between the production of
otherness in certain theoretical texts and the mass media. If the other becomes an internal
necessity for the market and as such its exteriority is conceived and produced within it,
perhaps something similar happens to the other as object of study. Sometimes the dis-
continuity, the difference between the authorized gaze and its object seems conceivable
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4 Of course this is not an opposition but a doubling of roles.
5 A premature example of that rhetoric appears in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, where refer-
ences to the “Indias interiores” [Indies within] are a commonplace in the implementation of the reforms
established by the Council of Trent. The native is no longer linked to a geographical otherness. What is
implied now, quite simply, is the subject that has not yet been civilized, and does not yet fulfill the
requirements of “modern” subjectivity.
in terms of an internal need. Our general hypothesis is that the production of a very par-
ticular kind of other is the result of a theoretical (and affective) necessity of certain acad-
emic discourses. And, to go one step further, that these “theoretical” needs are analogous
to a certain marketing strategy of the global market. What those two spaces have in com-
mon is the use of the other as a locus of nostalgia, as the place where the monument can
come back to life. Both the intellectual and the consumer4 turn a loss in the space of the
self into a recovery and a hope in the space of the other. Paradoxically then, the hope of
the self, its future, depends on the other but only as long as that otherness is scripted by
the self.
1. Kant
The dynamic of simultaneous dependence on, and production of, otherness does not
begin with its best known modern version, Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave. It has,
indeed, quite an interesting genealogy. Dussell (1995) and Todorov (1984), from differ-
ent perspectives, trace its origin to 1492. The discovery of the American other, the anxi-
ety to erase its difference, runs parallel to the production of a difference that gives the
agonizing integrity of the self the security of an outside or, in diachronic terms, a previ-
ous stage of historical development, one which allows the present to regard itself as
more advanced and (eventually) “modern”. One step further, and that otherness is inter-
nalized as a way to introduce an internal difference that maps the disciplinary action of
the state. A rhetoric of “internal colonialism” is introduced to facilitate the “civilizing
mission”.5
It is precisely this new, shifting place of the “native” that Spivak’s reading of Kant
makes explicit. Deconstructing Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Spivak establishes how the
place of the other is simultaneously negated and desperately needed to sustain the whole
theoretical schema of the Enlightenment. It is obsessively “foreclosed”, that is, expelled
from the symbolic universe of the subject despite being a fundamental signifier
(Laplanche/Pontalis 1974: 166). Only by means of producing a necessary outside – that
“raw man” barely mentioned in Kant and characterized by the presence of affect without
reason – can the Critique of Judgment establish the limits of the sublime as a territory,
the perception of which is linked to pure reason (Spivak 1999: 4-14).
We could take Spivak’s reading further and consider how the same schema works in
what can probably be considered one of the foundational theories of contemporary glob-
alization or at least certain aspects of it, the Critique of Pure Reason. The key moment of
Kantian ethics, the “Categorical Imperative”, is defined in opposition to the particular
and to affect. It is always already necessarily global; indeed, its only substantial charac-
terization is precisely that global reach without the presence of which, it is only an empty
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6 The creation of that void, that “empty continent”, has been extensively studied by Eduardo Subirats in a
book with that same title, El continente vacío. The manufacturing of the necessary otherness to fill that
void has been something common to the three modern versions of a global project: the Orbis Univer-
salis Christianus, the Enlightenment and the Global Market/Worldwide Democracy (Mignolo 2000:
280). All of them needed an other not only as a negative space against which to define the positivity of
the self, but also as the potential pre-subject to be assimilated, the necessary outside needed by the
expanding, imperial component of the project.
7 Moreiras traces the “epistemological privilege” to Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness. Moreiras’
use of the term is not critical. He sees in that element the basis for the essential role that the place of
“Lived Experience” has in the “Latin American Subaltern Studies” project. It is precisely that “unrepre-
sentable immediacy” of the subaltern subject that gives the project its political strength, its closeness to
materialist strategy (2001: 163-164). Moreiras finds in the other the point of conciliation of Derridian
“différance” and Marxist materialism.
functionality as Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) observed. But that “always already”
implies both the existence of an outside and its immediate negation once the assimila-
tion/education has been completed. The relationship between the civilized self and the
“raw” man can only be one of radical discontinuity.
The natural vehicle for Kantian reason, indeed its essential condition, is the horizon
of globalization and the colonial attitude that supports it. At the same time, its underlying
necessity is that of what Spivak calls the “native informant”, whose only conceivable
position is a radical outside that works as a blank space to be filled, that allows a global
civilizing project as the necessary script for the technologies of power.6
2. Jameson
That radical discontinuity between inside and outside which is sometimes conceived
as the first and the third world, reappears in a contemporary text seemingly very different
from Kant’s, “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism” (1986) by
Fredric Jameson. Here a formal structure similar to Kant’s is used with a radically differ-
ent purpose; it could, in fact, be characterized as its radical opposite. Despite being,
arguably, one of the most attacked and repudiated articles in years, its influence is unde-
niable and, as we will see, its theoretical gestures have been replicated incessantly in
some of the most influential works of Marxist Latin Americanism through the 80s and
90s. As in Kant, the other becomes a theoretical necessity in Jameson’s argument, at least
a very particular kind of other, the one that stays as such without endangering the space
of the self, separated by what he calls a “fundamental break” (1986: 67).
Jameson’s theory is built, like the Kantian narrative, on a radical discontinuity, an
essential difference. But Kant’s terms are meticulously reversed. The other, the “native
informant”, now has a crucial “epistemological privilege” over the self: he is the one
who knows, because he is the one closer to the real, still untouched by the omnivorous
presence of the symbolic in the first world.7 Third world writers cannot avoid history,
experience. They are condemned to the real in the Hegelian sense:
The slave is called upon to labor for the master and to furnish him with all the material
benefits befitting his supremacy. But this means that, in the end, only the slave knows what
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reality and the resistance of matter really are; only the slave can attain some true materialistic
consciousness of his situation; since it is precisely to that that he is condemned (Hegel, in
Jameson 1986: 85).
It is in this context that Jameson develops the role of allegory as the necessary vehi-
cle of third world expression, an allegory conditioned by a radical closeness to the real. It
is, “conscious and overt; implies a radically different and objective relationship of poli-
tics to libidinal dynamics” (Jameson 1986: 80).
Jameson has in mind a conception of allegory very distant from the one that we find,
for example, in Benjamin, which, in Idelber Avelar’s words “is parallel and coextensive
with a fundamental impossibility to represent the ultimate ground, a constitutive failure
that installed the object of representation as lost object” (Avelar 1999: 15). For Jameson,
allegory is the opposite of a failure, indeed it is the vehicle of, at leas, the possibility of
objective representation, and, from there, the door to utopia. Allegory is then inextrica-
bly tied to the remains of the real, the remains of history. It is a promise of historical
restoration or rather the restoration of history itself, and with it, materialist knowledge.
Allegory is the form that nostalgia takes in Jameson’s conception, the path to the recov-
ery of a privileged “objective” perception of the real.
Paradoxically then, the third world intellectual becomes an epistemological model, a
destiny, precisely because s/he remains untouched by the end of history. But that destiny
follows a nostalgic script, one that is explicit, for example, in the narrative of a trip to
Cuba:
[...] in the third world situation the intellectual is always, in one way or another a political
intellectual. No third-world lesson is more timely or more urgent for us today, among whom
the very term “intellectual” has withered away, as though it were the name for an extinct
species. Nowhere has the strangeness of this vacant position been brought home to me more
strongly than on a recent trip to Cuba, when I had the occasion to visit a remarkable college-
preparatory school on the outskirts of Havana. It is a matter of some shame for an American
to witness the cultural curriculum in a socialist setting which also very much identifies itself
with the third world. Over some three or four years, Cuban teenagers study poems of Homer,
Dante’s Inferno, the Spanish Theatrical classics, the great realist novels of the 19th century
European tradition, and finally, contemporary Cuban revolutionary novels [...] But the semes-
ter’s work I found most challenging was one explicitly devoted to the study of the role of the
intellectual as such: the cultural intellectual who is also a political militant, the intellectual
who produces both poetry and praxis [...] as this whole talk aims implicitly at suggesting a
new conception of the humanities in American education today, it is appropriate to add that
the study of the role of the intellectual as such ought to be a key component in any such pro-
posals (1986: 74-75).
One might object to a couple of things here: the idealization of a Cuban education in
which “enlightenment” is never placed into dialogue with its other side, “indoctrina-
tion”; or the fascination with a teleological Hegelian conception of history that treats
“revolutionary” texts as the last stage of a historical evolution. But what I find more
interesting here is the way in which the third world, the socialist third world in particular,
becomes the model to fill a “vacant space”, that of an “extinct species”, the “organic
intellectual” in the Gramscian tradition. The space of the other is the space of survival
for something that the self has lost. It gives us the promise of a recovery, a restoration:
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“What is lacking in the civilized west is found at the heart of ‘uncivilized’ exterior” [and
that adjective should be read positively from Jameson’s perspective] (Szeman 2001: 809).
This restoration has a second aspect in Jameson’s text: the third world is also a
model, since “privatization” has not yet spoiled the sense of community. There is no dif-
ference between subject and community. Politics are immanent to that subject while in
the first world the hypertrophy of individual subjectivity has killed politics.8
We find, then, the same paradoxical structure that we saw in Kant. Jameson has in
mind a liberatory project that is universal, “homogenizing” in Aijaz Ahmed’s words,
where “difference between the first world and the third is absolutized as otherness, but
the enormous cultural heterogeneity of social formations within the so-called third world
is submerged within a singular identity of ‘experience’” (1992: 104). Hence, that univer-
sal project requires a fundamental break or discontinuity, a radical alterity imposed on
another condemned to stay in that privileged closeness to the real. The possibility of
utopia is projected onto the other after its failure in the space of the self. As Santiago
Colás (1994: 7) or Eduardo Subirats (1994) remind us, the schema is familiar to those
who study Latin America. Again and again, the New World was—and continues to be—
the “blank space” that has solicited the writing of utopia.9
3. “Testimonio”
In fact, some of the most important currents of Latin Americanism in the last decade
tend to replicate Jameson’s nostalgic use of the place of the other as “epistemological
privilege” and reserve of the real. Take, for example, the corpus of critical writing around
the “anti-literary” aura of “testimonio”.
Probably the most provocative analysis and criticism of that corpus has been devel-
oped by Neil Larsen, who is, paradoxically, one of the most orthodox among the Marxist
8 If we consider Jameson’s theoretical background, we can find still another reason for that “absolute”
need of difference and discontinuity between the first and the third world. The role of “objective”
knowledge and materialism at the chore of Marxist epistemology suffered in the 60s from the attack of
Althusserian psychologism. The “contamination” of Marxism by psychoanalysis, in particular Lacanian
thought, implied a radical crisis of identity. Althusser’s willful confusion of the cultural and the materi-
al, superstructure and infrastructure, meant no less than the questioning of the basis of Marxism. For
Jameson, the very identity of Marxism resets in the possibility of the real and within a first world where
privatization has caused a hypertrophy of the symbolic, the theoretical need of that discontinuity which
has to be projected onto the other, conceived precisely as that remainder of the real that allows a future
and a destiny for materialist thought.
9 Jameson’s conception of utopia is masterfully developed in “Of Islands and Trenches: Neutralization
and the Production of Utopian Discourse” (1988). By the end of the article, it is clear that, for Jameson,
utopia is nothing but the “utopia” of the recovery of history. Utopian discourse is an invocation for his-
torical praxis, a prelude to a “scientific theory of society”: “[...] Utopia’s deepest subject, and the source
of all that is most vibrantly political about it, is precisely our inability to conceive it, our incapacity to
produce it as a vision, our failure to project the Other of what is, a failure that, as with fireworks dis-
solving back into the night sky, must once again leave us alone with this history. This is surely the ulti-
mate sense in which ‘Utopian discourse accompanies ideological discourse as its converse and desig-
nates the still empty place of a scientific theory of society’” (1988: 101). In this sense, Latin America
and the third world in general, is conceived by Jameson precisely as the place of utopia, the place for
the recovery of history.
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10 In this sense the famous Rigoberta Menchú controversy originated by David Stoll’s book in which he
questions the veracity of some parts of Menchú’s narrative would be an artificial one: Stoll’s position is
nothing but a necessary supplement of Beverley’s reading. It is only possible after Beverley gave prior-
ity to the “truth effect”, the transparency of language/experience, as the privileged way to read the testi-
monio. The controversy has been extensively documented in Arturo Arias’ volume (2001).
thinkers dealing with Latin America and very close to Jameson’s positions in many ways.
In the introduction to his Reading North by South, Larsen characterizes theoretical writ-
ing about “testimonio” as the result of a double exercise in nostalgia. First, the aesthetic
exercise: the anti-literary obsession of Beverley and others revives a modernist concep-
tion of the aesthetic in a moment of crisis. “Testimonio” is systematically opposed to a
conception of the aesthetic that limits its boundaries to formalist priorities of high mod-
ernism. In Larsen’s words:
The elevation or counter canonization of the testimonial as post literary, post representa-
tional and the like, effectively exempts the reader as theorist from questioning his or her own
dogmatically modernist preconceptions regarding the nature of the literary itself (1995: 10).
Paradoxically then, the “canonization” of “testimonio” implies the survival of the
modernist artistic “aura” by means of its transposition to a kind of “anti-literary aura”. In
any case, what survives is precisely the fetishistic, aural conception of art. That nostalgic
restoration has a second, political moment:
The testimonial and testimonialista (or what is postulated in effect as this direct identity) cer-
tainly look like compensatory projections of the ex-new left reader’s own post Vietnam experi-
ence of isolation and alienation, cultural but also fundamentally, political (Larsen 1995: 16).
Idelber Avelar links this compensatory attitude with the same revival of the real that
we saw in Jameson:
It is imperative to interrogate that triumphal rhetoric with which testimonio was sur-
rounded during the 80s, especially in the United States and largely, I believe, as an imaginary
compensation for the succession of defeats undergone by the left in recent decades. In cir-
cumstances of political isolation it is all too comforting to imagine that redemption is just
around the corner, being announced by a subaltern voice transparently coincident with its
experience and supplying the critical oppositional intellectual with the golden opportunity to
satisfy a good conscience (1999: 67).
Along with that “epistemological advantage”, Beverley (1993: 74, 80) and Yúdice
(1989: 228-229) find in their readings of Menchú the same radical confusion between
subject and community that Jameson postulated. Taking at face value Rigoberta’s words
“I don’t own my life, I’ve decided to offer it to a cause” (1984: 270) and suspending any
post-structuralist, post-Demanian suspicion that would probably appear in the considera-
tion of any first world “autobiography”, Beverley and Yúdice choose to read Rigoberta
as an “accurate” and not symbolic or rhetorical account of her experience.10 The
author/narrator quite simply “is” his/her community, and the private is radically
immersed in the political to the point of extinction. Indeed as Larsen points out, the
Rev25-01  1/3/07  13:11  Página 13
14 Alberto Medina
11 See also Beverley (1993: 76).
12 And that is exactly what Doris Sommer using Levinas (but also Spivak before her) theorizes in her new
book about the aesthetics of resistance: “Secrets can cordon off curious and controlling readers from the
vulnerable objects of their attention. Secrecy is a safeguard to freedom, Emmanuel Levinas argues,
against Hegel who ridiculed it; it is the inviolable core of human subjectivity that makes interaction a
matter of choice rather than rational necessity. ‘Only starting from this secrecy is the pluralism of soci-
ety possible’” (1999: 119). A similar idea can be found in Moreiras: “Going so far as to speak, in speak-
ing to us, the very unsayability of what must remain unspoken is what makes Menchú’s word an episte-
mologically privileged text in the tradition of Latin American testimonio. I would claim that the secret,
in Menchú’s text, stands for whatever cannot and should not be reabsorbed into the literary-representa-
tional system: the secret is the (secret) key to the real as unguarded possibility” (2001: 228). Yet anoth-
er version of the same idea would be Glissant’s conception of “opacity”: “The opaque is not the obscure,
though it is possible for it to be so and to be accepted as such. It is that which cannot be reduced, which
is the most perennial guarantee of participation and confluence” (1997: 191).
authorial function itself is dissolved in a total lack of distance between representation,
personal experience and the experience of the community (1995: 9).11 Representation,
then, becomes pure practice. But, if the “epistemological privilege” belongs to the other,
how can the European self share that practical dimension? Again, what we find in the
other is a model for the future, a horizon and fetishized possibility of action. To preserve
that possibility of practice, analogous to the role of the Gramscian intellectual that Jame-
son misses in the first world, the reader coming from that first world must keep his dis-
tance and respect the otherness of the other.12 The reader has to acknowledge a limit, the
existence of a secret that will not be revealed to him because of a radical discontinuity
which makes sharing impossible. But what exactly is the difference between respecting
the other and condemning him to his otherness or, one step further, producing that other-
ness? Despite his critical reading of this gesture, Larsen repeats a similar one at the very
beginning of his book: “There is a certain sense in which the act of writing and reading
about Latin America from a location outside it, has never required an apology” (1995: 2).
Why should it? What Larsen reveals here is the very same “epistemological privi-
lege” we found in Jameson. Natives are better positioned to know because they are clos-
er than we are to the real. But doesn’t that gesture force the native to a locus of “objec-
tivity”? He becomes responsible for the survival of a discontinuity—between the
symbolic and the real, super and infrastructure—that is theoretically necessary and which
is now projected as radical distance between self and other, subject and object of knowl-
edge; a discontinuity that safely separates epistemology and hermeneutics. The dramatic
questioning of that separation closes Aijaz Ahmed’s chapter on Jameson: “Jameson’s is
not a first world text; mine is not a third world text. We are not each other’s civilization-
al others (1992: 122). Although the proposal of a theoretical alternative exceeds the lim-
its of this discussion, Walter Mignolo gives us an interesting idea of what such an alter-
native would be like in his concept of “border gnoseology”:
The goal is to erase the distinction between the knower and the known, between a
“hybrid” object (the borderland as the known) and a “pure” disciplinary or interdisciplinary
subject (the knower) uncontaminated by the border matters he or she describes. To change the
terms of the conversation it is necessary to overcome the distinction between subject and
object, on the one hand, and between epistemology and hermeneutics on the other (2000: 18).
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13 Some of its after-effects could also be considered along these lines, for example Schnabel’s Before
Night Falls (2000). Schnabel, one of the most important “stars” of  the visual arts in the 80s shot this
film after his first feature, Basquiat (1996), in which he portrayed the tragic life of another great con-
temporary painter unable to survive his stardom, his becoming-symbol. It would be interesting to devel-
op a parallel reading of Basquiat and Reinaldo Arenas in these films as elegiac figures of a “real life”
unable to survive in oppressive “symbolic” systems (either that of the market or Castro’s Cuba); which
is precisely the world in which Schnabel has thrived.
4. Wenders
The interest in the restoration of the real, the fascination for the “truth effect” in
Latin America is by no means a gesture limited to academia. Marketing strategies
addressed to first world tourists picture that same Havana visited by Jameson as a space
of nostalgic recovery. In an essential article about photographic representations of pre-
sent-day Cuba, Ana Dopico refers to a touristy image in which ruins and sentiments are
presented in the foreground. Cuba becomes a historical theme park, a museum of the
Cold War years and a paralyzed revolution. Cuba is now a “political fantasy”, a “nostal-
gic commodity” where “Cuban subjects are constituted as consumable images by the
gaze of desire or of pity, the gaze of solidarity, the gaze of the uncanny” (2002: 453).
Slavoj Zizek has taken that reading one step further. The Cuban image is that of a
“dialectics at a stand-still”: “Do we not encounter in Cuba [...] a kind of negative mes-
sianic time: the social stand-still in which ‘the end of time is near’ and everybody is
waiting for the miracle of what will happen when Castro dies, and socialism collapses?”
(2002: 7).
Cuba is for Zizek the perfect example of the radical paradox that sustains what, bor-
rowing Alain Badiou’s concept, he calls the “passion for the Real”, the twentieth century
obsession for “delivering the thing itself”:
[This passion for the Real] culminates in its apparent opposite, in a theatrical spectacle
[...] If, then, the passion for the Real ends up in the pure semblance of the spectacular effect
of the Real, then, in an exact inversion, the ‘postmodern’ passion for the semblance ends up
in a violent return to the passion for the Real (2002: 9-10).
That reciprocal paradox is at the very heart of what has probably been one of the
most successful “representations” of Cuba by mass media in the last decade: Wim Wen-
der’s Buena Vista Social Club (1999).13
Wenders’ documentary turns into a fascinating object of study if considered in the
context of his artistic development. The German director is by no means a blockbuster
specialist who would film a predictable advertisement for the American tourist industry,
but rather one of the most respected arthouse directors alive, an essential name in the
New German Cinema movement that includes Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Werner Her-
zog, Margarethe von Trotta and others. Alongside his movies, Wenders has a long list of
theoretical articles that reveal a very particular approach to cinematic principles. BVSC
is not a radical departure from Wenders’ interests; rather, it establishes a fascinating dia-
logue with his previous films and theoretical writings. If there is a constant obsession in
his work, it is precisely the relationship between cinema and the “truth effect”, the “ethical
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14 The film was shot roughly two years after Ry Cooder’s trip to Havana. The documentary is then, at least
partially, a fictional one. The musicians are “acting” an encounter that happened months before. In the
case of Compay, that “acting” is full of “choteo” cubano. He quite often “mocks” his own acting, giving
the crew what they ask for in a very ironic and explicit way. The same ironic game is explicit in the very
means chosen by Wenders to shoot the “documentary”. He uses digital video and systematically
enhances the colors to give a brighter image of Cuba.
responsibility” to “present” rather than “represent” reality. Wenders grew up in a post-
war German society that, according to him, had lost the faith in its own images. All his
work can be read as an attempt to recover that faith. In response to the question “Why do
you make films?” Wenders once answered: “[Balázs, one of the fathers of film theory,]
talks about the ability (and the responsibility) of cinema ‘to show things as they are’.
And he says cinema can ‘rescue the existence of things’. That’s precisely it” (Graf 2002:
4). It is not that BVSC is an exercise in restoration; it also, and perhaps mainly, shows
that for Wenders, the very meaning of cinema is restoration, the recovery of a reality
whose truth has somehow been lost.
Things turn more complicated when Wenders feels disappointed by the loss of reali-
ty that he perceives when traveling through the USA and Japan. While shooting Paris,
Texas or Tokyo-Ga, two of his masterpieces, he cannot but portray a sense of loss and
nostalgia. But the reason why those geographies do not feel real anymore is because they
do not look like John Ford’s or Yasujiro Ozu’s movies. They have lost the essence that
the old masters knew how to freeze.
Hence Wenders’ films exist somewhere between the faithful depiction of reality and
its nostalgic re-production. His radical refusal of history, of the possibility of a diachron-
ic development rather than a necessary progressive dissolution of “reality” is parallel to
his marginalization of the story, the narrative dimension that according to him betrays
the truth of images. Film’s purpose is never to “tell” but rather to “show” (Graf 2002: 4).
The radical contradictions that sustain Wenders’ extraordinary career are never more
apparent than in BVSC. When he travels to Cuba his disposition is analogous to what we
saw in Jameson. If the American critic sees in the third world the possibility of recover-
ing a certain proximity to the real and the ideal of the organic intellectual who was linked
to it, and if Jameson’s Havana school gives an image of the restoration of utopia, Wen-
ders too tries to fill a void, and to save the truth of images from extinction.
The documentary is explicitly centered in an exercise of restoration. Ry Cooder trav-
els to Cuba in search of the authentic, in this case, “authentic” Cuban music. His role, in
this sense, is similar to that of other characters in Wenders’ movies, for example the
sound technician in Lisbon Story who anxiously records the “real sounds” of the city
while waiting for a film crew that never arrives. Nevertheless, from the first shots of the
film, that exercise of restoration is presented, in a perfect illustration of Zizek’s idea, as
an ironic spectacle of itself. Images of Compay Segundo (one of the musicians) guiding
the film crew in their search (or rather pretending—in a very explicit way—to do it), are
intermingled with shots of a theatre in Amsterdam, where the (European) public is wait-
ing for the musicians to appear.14
What Cooder finds, with the “help” of Compay, or maybe what he wants to find, are
ruins. The “Buena Vista Social Club” does not exist anymore, but its traces remain in the
wrinkled faces and the hyper-expressive voices of half-forgotten masters. Cooder and
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15 Interestingly the same fascination with third world passion (which includes Spain as a European margin
never really integrated in the processes of modernity) reappears in the opposite extreme of the political
spectrum, Gianni Vattimo’s postmodernism. In his prologue to the Spanish edition of his Transparent
Society, Vattimo finds in Latin passion the antidote to “Weberian” rationalization and the protestant
ascetic ethics of capitalism (1990: 68).
Wenders are not interested in a present contaminated by American pop music and blast-
ing rap in the streets; what they are after is a fetishized past that can turn history into pre-
sent. From thereon in, one cannot distinguish restoration from the manufacturing of
authenticity. The other is simultaneously represented and produced, and the “performa-
tive” aspect of the film is there for anyone to see. Tourist Cuba lives off the compulsive
imitation of its own authenticity. Ninety-year-old musicians are beginning to proliferate
not only in Cuba but also on the international concert circuit.
The Cuban image becomes the locus of a transhistorical experience where past and
present come together, where old sepia postcards suddenly come to “life” with all its
aura. But of course that aura is now nothing but the trace, the burn of technology on the
body and the image of the other.
But something more is restored than the past image of truth. If Kant saw in affect vs.
reason one of the essential components of the “raw man” vs. the “civilized man”, if
Jameson finds in the native a reserve of passion, a “passion for change and social repre-
sentation”15, it is no coincidence that Ry Cooder privileges hyper-expressive voices and
genres. There is a reason why Wenders portrays the apotheosis of the musicians in the
concert given at the Carnegie Hall in New York as a radical invasion by affect of the cold
and distant space of the Hall usually dedicated to classical music. Suddenly the blacks
and whites of the classical orchestra are substituted by the flashy touches of color in the
clothes worn by the Cuban musicians. Suddenly the strictly codified behavior of the
classical stage is forgotten behind the spontaneous warmth and tears, and a sense of fam-
ily intimacy—the intimacy promised by Ibrahim Ferrer, one of the musicians, after invit-
ing the camera and the spectator behind it into his most private space, his home:
“Quisiera que conocieran lo que soy, como soy”. A promise of real intimacy is also pre-
sent in the tourist brochures analyzed by Ana Dopico: “Viajar a Cuba no es soñar, aunque
lo parece [...] sino ir derecho a un mundo de contrastes, emplazado en una naturaleza
única y maravillosa. Es conocer a gente simpática, sus anhelos y realidades. No es imag-
inar (2002: 462).
The other’s presence, then, is identified as an invasion of affect, not an imaginary but
a real one. But if that affect is, in the film, essentially a product of consumption, in Jame-
son (and Vattimo) it is nothing less than a path for political agency. The other is conceived
as a supplement that provides what is missing in the self, a passion made possible, in the
third world, by closeness to the real, and denied to the first world by the omnipresence of
simulation and privatization. The problem is, of course, that passion now becomes either
an economic or an intellectual commodity, and in any case it is integrated into the dynam-
ics of commodity fetishism, the system of value production driven by the market.
Authenticity and affect become the places of their own simulation. They are no
longer “discovered” but rather produced, either by the nostalgic first world citizen trying
to experience again what he has lost or by the third world citizen, giving to the tourist
what he asks for in return for survival.
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16 Margolles’ work brings up very different references in Mexico or Spain on the one hand and in USA on
the other. While in a catholic context the tradition of “ex-votos” and “reliquias” is an immediate refer-
ence that suggests a social use of religious imagery, in USA the immediate antecedent would be the
Body Art developed in the 60’s and 70’s (and its aftermath art dealing with AIDS in the 80’s) in which
masochistic attitudes were used as a sort of shock therapy applied to the self in opposition to the inva-
sion (or the ignorance) of the private by the “society of spectacle” (of course all those references would
overlap for a good part of the public in every place). To develop all these references falls beyond the
limits of the present text.
17 Patronato de Arte Contemporáneo. In: <http://pac.org.mx/slg/8/source/2.html> (7/2005).
18 Medina, Cuauhtémoc: “Respirando Espíritus.” In: La Reforma. <http://www.reforma.com/editoriales/
articulo/168662/default.htm> (7/2005).
5. Margolles
The extreme consequences of that production of otherness as a reserve of affect and
of the real are illustrated in the work of Teresa Margolles, one of the most important and
acclaimed young Latin American artists working today. All her work uses real human
remains to invite radical, gut reactions in spectators confronted with the paradigmatic
locus of the real, the corpse. A good example of her work is a piece entitled “Burial”
(from 1999, the same year as BVSC): behind the appearance of a minimal cement block,
what we “really” have is the atrocious proximity of a stillborn child. Our position as
spectators is at once conditioned by the certainty of the presence of the Real and its
simultaneous symbolization as Real.
Margolles became famous some years ago on the American art scene thanks to the
exhibition of a piece in ACE, one of the most prestigious Art galleries in Los Angeles.
Under the title “Tongue” she displayed a real, forensically preserved, pierced tongue
belonging to a Mexican youth who had died of an overdose. In front of the piece, a short
narrative explained that she had bought the tongue from the teenager’s mother in
exchange for the expenses of the burial. Margolles takes the “truth effect” that Beverley
finds in testimonio to its unbearable extreme. What the visitor to the gallery contemplates
is the radically preserved reality of the corpse turned into auratic, artistic fetishism.16
The media response to these pieces and to Margolles’ work in general makes con-
stant reference to a certain kind of “exemplarity”. Here are just two examples, one from
a PAC [Patronato de Arte Contemporáneo] catalogue, the other one from a review article
that appeared in La Reforma, one of the leading Mexican newspapers:
Were one to look for a truly specific kind of art practice coming from the so-called third
world, Margolles would be a perfect example.17
Few times when writing about an exhibition, one has the sensation of witnessing a work
destined to be a reference. Among other things it points to the level of sophistication reached
by contemporary artistic practice in Mexico City. It attempts to intervene in a context highly
charged both socially and politically through works that, at the same time, establish a dia-
logue and question the frontiers of art in a global context.18
But what is Margolles’s work really “referring” to? What is the content of its “refer-
entiality”? Isn’t this the other side of the exemplarity that Jameson and Vattimo find in
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the third world? The other is able to negotiate a privileged placement in the global market
as long as it presents itself as the “Real thing”, preferably if that surplus of reality is pre-
sented as the synchronic juxtaposition of the signifier and the referent of the other’s rad-
ical violence, the perfect antidote to post-structuralist fluctuations and to the ubiquity of
the symbolic. But of course, the ultimate subversion of Margolles’ work is that the real is
presented precisely as an obscene signifier of itself or rather its absence, its radical con-
fusion with the symbolic. The object of her pieces is located not in the real itself but in
the libidinal economy of the fascinated gaze. We want to see. But contemplating the
excess of the real is nothing but the strategy chosen by blindness. This dynamic has been
masterfully described by Slavoj Zizek:
[...] we should abandon the standard metaphorics of the Real as the terrifying thing that is
impossible to confront face to face, as the ultimate Real concealed beneath the layers of
imaginary and/or symbolic veils: the very idea that, beneath the deceptive appearances, there
lies hidden some ultimate Real Thing too horrible for us to look at directly, is the ultimate
appearance—this Real thing is a fantasmatic specter whose presence guarantees the consis-
tency of our symbolic edifice, thus enabling us to avoid confronting its constitutive inconsis-
tency (‘antagonism’). Take Nazi ideology: the Jew as its Real is a specter evoked in order to
conceal social antagonism—that is, the figure of the Jew enables us to perceive social totality
as an organic Whole (2002: 31-32).
Isn’t this the place sometimes reserved for the colonial other and its difference? Isn’t
this radical outside of the real, this fantasmatic specter that gives homogeneity to “our”
symbolic space and finally “preserves” the security of its (artistic, political) frontiers?
A piece presented by Margolles at the P.S.1 in New York takes us one step further. In
the context of a collective exhibition entitled “Mexico City: An Exhibition About the
Exchange Rate of Bodies and Values”, Margolles is represented by “Vaporization”. The
work consists of an empty looking room in which the spectator is immersed in a diffused
light and a misty environment of vaporized water. When we read the corresponding
explanation, we realize that the foggy mist is composed of water used to wash corpses in
the Mexico City Morgue, of course conveniently disinfected to avoid any kind of conta-
gion. This is as far as we can get to becoming the other. It impregnates our clothes, we
breathe and internalize it but, still, the limits of consumption are safe. Its death is not
going to touch us. This is a pure simulation of “sharing”, but it could work as the deictic
of another real “sharing”, that in which we cannot separate the other from ourselves and
vice versa, that in which the horror of the “real” is not the monopoly of the other. It is in
this sense that Zizek puts into dialogue the representations of death in the space of the
other (Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq) marked by the explicit, the gruesome and those in the space
of the self (How many corpses did we see on 9/11?) (2002: 13). For Zizek, as for Alain
Badiou, the ethical position is precisely the one that makes no distinctions, the one that
asks not how could it happen here, but quite simply how could it happen anywhere? The
only space for thought and moral responsibility is a global space. The respect for differ-
ence implies its contextualization in a global mechanism, and constant interaction with it.
In Margolles’ pieces, the other is not represented but rather presented as mutilated
body. The other becomes the real, but at the same time that reality is presented as its own
unbearable aura, as its infamous symbolization. Margolles’ brutal shock therapy to “civ-
ilized” ethics for the sake of art is the ultimate postmodern gesture but also its criticism.
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The ethical responsibility for the other implies the need to read Margolles precisely not
as a work of art,19 in a symmetrical gesture to that of Stockhausen who scandalously
asserted that 9/11 should be read as the ultimate work of art.20 Responsibility begins in
dreams, in the symbolic. To accept Jameson’s idea of closeness to the real is to maintain,
dangerously, that status of difference and the frontiers of art, and to believe in a “funda-
mental break” between the real and the symbolic. In that scenario the other does not have
the “epistemological privilege” of closeness to the material world, but rather becomes
the real itself for the intellectual or aesthetic “enjoyment” of western eyes. The silent and
atrocious proximity of unbearable injustice is wrapped distantly and comfortably in the
artistic aura. Reality now has a place in museums.
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